|
Scott & Huff, P.C. 1000 S. Garfield Ave. Suite 3 Traverse City, MI 49686 (231) 933-5322 |
||||||||||||
|
Boundary Line Disputes or In Whose Property are the Pieces of Eight Buried If you think a foot of water front at Harbor Springs or on Mission Point is the most valuable piece of property in Michigan, you are mistaken. Its the disputed foot that lies at the border of Mr. and Mrs. Jones' lot and Mr. and Mrs. Smith's lot right there in Battlefield Creek, Cadillac or Jackson. That foot is precious beyond counting and completely unique to those who have foregone any pleasures of neighborliness and friendship in order to protect their claim that that which may be theirs is in fact is theirs in law. Folks of ordinary competence can easily weigh the projected costs of commercial or tort litigation and the probabilities of success (however that is to be measured) and come to a compromise that pleases no one but each can live with. Boundary line disputants appear to have in large measure thrown aside the economics books, they can only gird their loins and proceed to battle. What such a deep-seated attitude signifies about our psyche is difficult to determine but it does certainly contribute to the plethora of reported cases, since losers tend to be not too dispirited to appeal. Not surprisingly, these cases fall into several different categories each with different flavors of facts and proof requirements. Roughly grouped together, these kinds of cases are as follows: 1. Jones and Smith share a boundary line. Neither know where it is exactly, but both occupy to an established line for a period in excess of 15 years. Upon survey, the occupation line is not the correct line. 2. Jones and Smith resolve informally a dispute as to where an uncertain boundary line is supposed to be. Later, the survey shows them to have been wrong. 3. Jones and Smith are both grantees of a common grantor who conveyed the mistaken descriptions with regards to a location on the ground as being the boundary. 4. Jones and Smith share a boundary line but neither has occupied to the boundary or engaged in any other behavior that will settle where the line should be. 5. Jones and Smith share a boundary line of record. Smith knowing it is not his property occupies part of Jones' property for a tennis court. 6. Jones and Smith City or the State of Michigan argue about a common boundary. 1. Jones and Smith share a boundary line. Neither know where it is exactly, but both occupy to an established line for a period in excess of 15 years. Upon survey, the occupation line is not the correct line. This set of facts brings into play the doctrine of acquiescence. If the parties have acted like they agree that this is where the boundary line is for the period of limitation then irrespective of what the true placement of the line is, the line of occupation will be deemed to be the boundary line even though one or more of them is mistaken in fact. This rule goes at least as far back as Fhaey v . Marsh, 40 Mich 236 (1879). The statute of limitations for actions arising out of acquiescence in a boundary line or adverse possession case is MCLA 600.5801, MSA 27A.5801 (see attached). These type of cases fall under the last class and, therefore, the time limitation is 15 years. Court statements regarding this rule abound; for example in Johnson v Squires, 344 Mich 687, 692 72 NW2d 45 (1956), the Supreme Court quoted Dupont v Starring, 42 Mich 492, 494 NW 190 (1880) as follows: "It has been repeatedly held by this Court that a boundary line long treated and acquiesced in as the true line ought not to be disturbed on new surveys. Fifteen years recognition and acquiescence are ample for this purpose." In Hanlon v TenHove, 235 Mich 227, 233 209 NW 169 (1926), the Supreme Court stated: "The original survey may have been inaccurate, its lines may not correctly and accurately fix the boundary, but if they have been acquiesced in for a sufficient length of time, they fix the 'true line' as a matter of fact and as a matter of law." See also McGee v Eriksen, 51 Mich App 551, 215 NW2d 571(1974) and Rock v Derrick, 51 Mich App 704, 216 NW2d 496 (1974) and cases cited thereunder. Also, Pyne v Elliott, 53 Mich App 419, 220 NW2d 54 (1974) and cases thereunder. Under this type of acquiescence case, there is a mutual mistake in fact but the equitable concepts of latches and estoppel are applied. If Jones has sat on his right to dispute the line too long, Jones will lose the right even if Jones doesn't even know he had it. Presumably at any time during the statutory period, Jones could have ordered up the survey, found out where the correct line is and undertake a resolution of the joint mistaken apprehension as to where the line should be. Note that this type of case does not require that there have been a prior dispute and conscious resolution by acquiescence in a particular line. This is the next type case. 2. Jones and Smith resolve informally a dispute as to where an uncertain boundary line is supposed to be. Later, the survey shows them to have been wrong. The rule as to handling this type of case was stated in Warner v Noble, 286 Mich 654 662, 282 NW 855 (1938) as follows: "The basis of the rule that boundaries may be fixed by verbal agreement, long
acquiescing, and the theory of acquiring title by adverse possession are diametrically
opposed to. The theory of ownership to an agreed boundary proceeds upon ground
there has been a bona fide dispute as to the true boundary line and the parties have by
peaceful agreement made a friendly settlement of this dispute which has been
acquiesced in, carried out and performed by the respective parties. The theory of Other cases, however, have not required the 15 year period for such disputes to be resolved before it is rekindled. In Cochran v Milligan, 359 Mich 148, 151, 101 NW2d 292 (1960) the Court held: "It has been frequently held in this state that where parties by mutual agreement, and for that expressed purpose, meet and fix a boundary line, and thereafter acquiesce in the line so established between them, such line will be considered the true line between them, notwithstanding the period of such acquiescence falls short of the time fixed by the statute of limitations for gaining title by adverse possession." (Citing Jones v Pashbv, 67 Mich 459, 35 NW 152 (1887)). This rule appear to take its origin from the actual agreement made and performed by the parties. 3. Jones and Smith are both grantees of a common grantor who conveyed the mistaken descriptions with regards to a location on the ground as being the boundary. This rule is a little more wishy washy. It is described vaguely in Rock v Derrick, 51 Mich App 704, 216 NW2d 496, and again in McGee v Eriksen, 51 Mich App 551, 215 NW2d 571(1974). It is described in McGee v Eriksen as "a third species of the acquiescence doctrine arises out of the intent of a common grantor to effect the practical location of a boundary line." 51 Mich App 559 citing Maes v Olmstead, 247 Mich 180, 225 NW 583 (1929), and Daley v Gruber, 361 Mich 358, 104 NW2d 807 (1960). In Pyne v Elliott, 53 Mich App 419, 428, 220 NW2d 54 (1974), the Court of Appeals compared the three branches of the doctrine of acquiescence and applied them to the case as follows: "All parties occupied and developed their land up to line 1, since that line was incorrectly drawn by Scott Engineering in 1946. Thereafter, all parties have acquiesced in the establishment of line 1 as the boundary line between the north and south halves of Government Lot 4, for more than the statutory 15 year period, and that boundary line will not now be disturbed." "The northern boundary has been erroneously established at line I for so many years that the plaintiff's predecessors in interest intended to deed from that line." "'It must be presumed that description in later conveyances by one of these parties, necessarily involving such boundary, are intended to refer to the boundary so located on the ground and not to some other imaginary line or point which might have been taken in the absence of such location. Lapse of time is not involved in the situation, nor a compromise line after dispute, but rather, an identification or intended location by those who are to be affected." Cases cited (pp. 426-428) The facts in Dalev v Gruber are interestingly described as follows: "What we have is acquiescence of the sort considered in Maes v Olmstead, 247 Mich 180. It arises from the intention to describe in the deed the boundary marked on the ground by a common grantor. Although the 90 year fence above-described is not on the eastern boundary of defendant's property, and thus on the line in dispute, it is on the western boundary thereof. Furthermore, it marks not only the intended point of commencement of the description of the defendant's property, upon which, in turn, plaintiff's is dependent, but it marked the boundary, as well, between land conveyed to the defendants by plaintiff and her husband, and the Reese school property, formerly owned." "The doctrine of acquiescence would not permit the line of the old fence, so marked, to be disputed as a boundary between adjoining owners. Nor, it follows, may it be disputed with respect to other descriptions dependent upon its location" (p. 363) Another case following this rule is Newell v Jeffrey, 6 Mich App 279, 148 NW2d 886 (1967). What may be said about these cases is that they are not wholly different from the first rule, except that a mistake is made by a common grantor as opposed to two adjoining owners and the misapprehension as to the line is then continued by the respective grantees. 4. Jones and Smith share a boundary line but neither has occupied to the boundary or engaged in any other behavior that will settle where the line should be. Here we are concerned with resolution of disputes based upon the survey rules alone (more or less). In the first instance to the extent that a boundary line is a function of a section or quarter section line, then the line as originally surveyed controls even though it was mistakenly placed. In Poch v Urlaub, 357 Mich 261, 272, 98 NW2d 509 (1959), the Court quoted Mr. Justice Cooley in Diehl v Zanger, 39 Mich 601, 605, as follows: "Nothing is better understood than that few of our early plats will stand the test of a careful and accurate survey without disclosing errors. This is as true of the government surveys as of any others, and if all the lines were now subject to correction on new surveys, the confusion of lines and titles that would follow would cause consternation in many communities. Indeed the mischiefs that must follow would be simply incalculable, and the visitation of the surveyor might well be set down as a great public calamity." Suppose, however, that the original survey lines cannot be re-established from direct evidence. This is not unusual where water courses flow near such corners and by change of course, obliterate the evidence of the corner location. In Case v Trapp, 49 Mich 59, 61, 12 NW 908 (1882), the Court held as follows: "If the government surveys had all been accurate and in accordance with the rules laid down for the guidance of the surveyor, there would commonly be no difficulty in locating the government subdivisions with reasonable certainty, even after the monuments have disappeared. But it is notorious that the errors of the original surveys were frequent and sometimes considerable, and they were often such as to make a regular lot and lots of different sizes in the same neighborhood, where according to the field notes and the flats they should be alike. The consequent difficulty in locating boundaries after corner posts and witness trees are gone is appreciated by every intelligent surveyor." Occupancy lines may be observed as evidence of where the original lines are but only if there is other evidence that such occupation was based upon the original government survey. This is the view of Woodbury v Vena, 114 Mich 241,72 NW 189(1897). In Arnold v Brechtel, 174 Mich 147,140 NW 610 (1913), the Court did not rely upon meander lines of a creek that fixed the boundary line by the edge of the creek. In Poch v Urlaub, 357 Mich 261, 278, 98 NW2d 509 (1959), the Court quoted 6 Thompson on Real Property, Section 3332, p.529, for the following rule: "As a general rule where the original survey and government plat, a tract of land appears to have as its boundary a body of water, such body of water is a natural monument, and will constitute the boundary, however, distant or variant from the position indicated for it by the meander line, and hence will control as a call of the survey over either distances or quantity of land designated in the survey or on the government plat." When one gets below the sanctified errors of the government survey, then matters get somewhat more confusing and determined by a system of sometimes competing priorities. In a corollary of the parol evidence rule, the rule appears to be that where there is no ambiguity as to the description, it should be followed without looking into other matters which might tend to indicate that the intent of the parties was otherwise. In Gawrylak v Cowie, 350 Mich 679, 86 NW2d 809 (1957), the Court was faced with a contention of the defendants and their surveyor that the term "north" as used in several deeds to property adjoining on north and south, should be construed to mean "northwesterly" on the theory that it was the intention in each of the conveyances in question that the line from the starting point should follow the shore of Lake Huron. Emphasis is placed on the fact that if the description in the conveyances is followed literally, and the line measured north as directed, some of the land described is, at the present time at least, beneath the water of the lake. The trial judge concluded that the descriptions of the lots as set forth in the deeds were not ambiguous, and that under the generally accepted rule they must be followed. The Court quoted with approval 26 CJS Deeds Section 86 as follows: "In other words, it is the duty of the court to construe a deed as it is written, and if a deed is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect according to its language, for the intention and understanding of the parties must be deemed to be that which the writing declare. The meaning of the words used, and not what the parties may have intended by such language, is controlling." (p.683) The Court held that the language of the deed controlled and since there was no
ambiguity, found that "north" meant "north" not "northwesterly." This hard-line rule is
modified somewhat in the decision of Farabaugh v Rhode, 305 Mich 234, 9 NW2d "The general rule is that courts will follow the plain language in a deed in which there is no ambiguity. If, however, there is an ambiguity, or if the deeds fail to express the obvious intention of the parties, the courts will try to arrive at the intention of the parties and in accordance therewith grant or deny the relief asked for. Thus, in Negaunee Iron Company v Iron Cliffs Company, 134 Mich 264, we stated that where there is any doubt as to the meaning of an instrument, the courts will consider the situation, acts, conduct and dealings of the parties to the instrument and also as to the subject matter." In Arnold v Ellis, 5 Mich App 101, 145 NW2d 822 (1966), a case involving many
questions beside the basic survey questions, the Court reviewed a description which
ended with a call to an elm tree. This is how the description appeared in its first
version. The defendants sought to have the description revised to have the final
description run to a double elm tree which was apparently now visible. The Court
referred to a double elm tree as being in a later version of the description one year "The purpose of changing the description so as to conform to natural monuments is that these monuments were visible to the parties at the time of the original conveyance and more accurately indicate what was intended to be conveyed. Where the monuments no longer exist, however the description cannot be changed because there are no monuments to use as guidelines." (citing Clais v Danowski, (1964) 373 Mich 262) "The description is free from ambiguity; the surveyor called by the defendant was able to follow it precisely, and only encountered difficulty because of the erroneous reference to a double elm tree." "In the absence of ambiguity, the grantor is presumed to have intended to convey that which he described, and the land conveyed must be controlled by the written description." 7 Callaghan's Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, Deeds of Conveyance, Section 28, citing Juif v State Highwav Commissioner (1938), 387 Mich 335. "We conclude that the property owned by defendants is ascertainable by following the course and distance description and, therefore, there was no need for the court to construe the description by changing angles or points to conform to monuments or to determine the description as containing pond limits plus one rod as was done in this case." (pp. 117-118) In Weimer v Gilbert, 7 Mich App 207, 151 NW2d 348 (1967), another lake front case, the Court found that what had been intended by an original conveyance was a lake front lot and the fact that it was described by metes and bounds which identified it at a particular point on the water's edge was persuasive: "The fact that the waters of Marble Lake extended at one time to the courses and distances as expressed in the description of the plaintiff's deed, together with the plausible testimony of the surveyor for setting a key monument on an elevated bank away from a varying water level, leads to an inescapable conclusion, viz: the facts and circumstances of the case at bar present a situation where courses and distances must give way to a natural boundary. Turner v Holland(1887), 65 Mich 453; Farabaugh v Rhode[305 Mich 234, 9 NW2d 562 (1943)]." p. 215) The Court further quoted another rule of construction with regards to water front property as found in the Supreme Court case of Harden v Jordon (1891), 140 US 371, 391(11 SCT 808, 353 L.Fd. 428: "When land is bounded by a lake or pond, the water, equally as in the case of the river, is appurtenant to it; it constitutes one of the advantages of its situation, and the material part of its value, and enter it largely into the consideration for acquiring. Hence, the presumption is that a grant of land thus bounded is intended to include the contiguous land covered by water." (pp.215-216) The Court went on to hold that: "The fact the shoreline of the lake has receded from what was thought or intended to be a point of beginning on the shore of Marble Lake as described in plaintiff's deed is not fatal. The well accepted rule applies that a person owns to the water's edge absent some reservation to the contrary in his conveyance. "In Michigan, the law is clear that where property abuts a shoreline, that shoreline *** is the boundary of the property not withstanding its subsequent advancement or recession. Cutliff v Densmore (1958), 354 Mich 586, 590." (pp.215-216) Also see McConnell v Raspin, 46 Mich 303, 9 NW 426 (1881) and Monfort v Steven, 68 Mich 61, 35 NW 827 (1888). In other words, the intentions of the parties may be looked at to determine what a description is supposed to mean, for example a fence line referred to in a description and occupation to it may be dispositive of the intent of the parties and the issue even though the dimension of the line described to reach the fence line is incorrect. However, in Cooley v Marks, 17 Mich App 470, 169 NW2d 655 (1969), the Court held that a fence line was irrelevant to the determination of the boundary line where there was no reference to it in the deed, it was not on the boundary line and had possibly been erected for the convenience of the parties. This is also a reflection of the rule of surveying that calls to a monument, that is to a fence control over courses and distances. The rule is set forth in Diehi v Zanger, 39 Mich 601 (1878). In this case, all lots in a plat were monumented but off by 4 to 5 feet from the platted locations. Justice Cooley in his concurring opinion stated (pp.605-606): "The question is not how an entirely accurate survey would locate these lots, but how the original stakes located them. No rule in real estate law is more inflexible than that monuments control course and distance,--a rule that we have frequent occasion to apply in the case of public surveys, where its property, justice and necessity are never questioned. But its application in other cases in quite as proper, and quite as necessary to the protection of substantial rights. The city surveyor should, therefore, have directed his attention to the ascertainment of the actual location of the original landmarks set by Mr. Campau, and if those were discovered they must govern. If they are no longer discoverable, the question is where they were located; and upon that question the best possible evidence is usually to be found in the practical location of the lines, made at a time when the original monuments were presumably in existence and probably well known. Stewart v Carleton, 31 Mich., 270. As between old boundary fences, and any survey made after the monuments have disappeared, the fences are by far the better evidence of what the lines of a lot actually are, and it would have been surprising if the jury in this case, if left to their own judgment, had not so regarded them." "But another view should have been equally conclusive in this case. The long practical acquiescence of the parties concerned, in supposed boundary lines, should be regarded as such an agreement upon them as to be conclusive even if originally located erroneously." This opinion has been cited numerous times most recently, in Murrav v Buikema, 54 Mich App 382, 221 NW2d 193 (1974). What happens when you get into the country and are dealing with larger parcels of land. The same fence rules may control. But what if there is no fence and no monumentation, no adverse possession and no acquiescence? The language of the deed then controls. Such was the case in DeHollander v Holwerda, 45 Mich App 564, in which the Court found that neither had the plaintiffs proved that they had acquired title to a disputed 13 1~2 strip by reason of acquiescence in a boundary line nor had they proved that they had adversely possessed the property. Therefore, the record title holder, the defendant, was deemed to continue to be the owner of the property. Priority may attach to time in that if there is an overlap occasioned by a shortfall in
available line, the first in time will get the overlap. For example, A conveys to B the
east 1000 feet of a supposed 2000 foot wide parcel; later A conveys to C the west
1000 feet. If there is only 1980 feet in the parcel, C gets only 980 feet. Obviously, if
there was 2010 feet, A would still own a 10 foot strip. In farmland descriptions,
references to fractions as in "the west half" may create ambiguities when applied to According to "Clark on Surveying and Boundaries", Grimes, J., 3rd Edition, the rules for priorities of calls are based on the presumptions of the intention of the surveyor who first ran the line or lines in question. The highest priority attaches to visible and ascertained objects as monuments. These govern over courses and distances. A call to a line of a located survey is a monument controlling over a call for a distance. Placed monuments control over natural monuments. Courses control over distances and metes and bounds control over quantity. A stated course will control, though it changes the distance from the end of the line to the next monument. Section 480 of Clark on Surveying and Boundaries contains numerous other rules from cases all over the country and on fine questions should be consulted. A succinct statement of priority is found therein as follows: "The order of priority [is] natural objects as monuments, artificial monuments, adjacent boundaries, courses and distances with quantity last. Hollars v Stevenson, 121 md App 410, 99 NE2d 258 (1951)." For a very complete discussion of the cases in Michigan, see Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law. 5. Jones and Smith share a boundary line of record. Smith knowing it is not his property occupies part of Jones' property for a tennis court. This type of boundary line question is really one of adverse possession. These cases
are determined under the rubric of has the possessor established such possession to be
actual, visible, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and adverse to all. Here there is no
assumption that the parties agreed upon the placement of that part of the tennis court
across the boundary line. There is no mistake as to where the line is. There is no actual
or implied permission or acquiescence. Jones just takes land, fences it, covers it with
tarvia and occupies it as a tennis court. The 15 years go by and Smith never objects or
follows through on any objections that he may have. Jones is now the owner of the "We agree with the trial court that plaintiff did not acquire title by acquiescence. The record does not reveal any substantial period of time when the adjoining property owners thought that the retaining wall was the boundary line. Ted Gasper [plaintiff's predecessor in title] certainly knew it was not. Although plaintiffs thought that it was when they bought their house, they soon learned otherwise." "The law of adverse possession is not at odds with the law of acquiescence. Rather, it
is just the general law of acquiring title by the operation of the statute of limitations. A
claim of adverse possession requires clear and cogent proof that possession has been
actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted for the
statutory period of fifteen years. Thomas V Rex A Wilcox Trust, 185 Mich App 733,
736; 463 NW2d 190 (1990). These are not arbitrary requirements, but the logical
consequence of someone claiming by adverse possession having the burden of proving
that the statute of limitations has expired. To claim by adverse possession, one must "In this case, for plaintiffs to have acquired title to the property by adverse possession,
there must be some time when defendants or their predecessors were disseised of the
land. The mere act of building the retaining wall would not have done so. In fact, the
wall had a staircase on it, providing easy access from the gas station to the land on the
other side of the wall. Nor can we conclude that the Gaspers' mowing of the grass
deprived defendants' predecessors of possession of the land. Considering the relationship between Ted Gasper and the gas station, there is no reason to conclude "The erection of the fence along the top of the wall could have deprived the defendants' predecessors of possession. However, no evidence was presented about who built the fence or why. Because there is a presumption that land is possessed by the owner of record unless it is shown to be otherwise, see MCL 600.5867; MSA 27A.5867, we cannot conclude that the fence on the wall deprived the defendants' predecessors of possession of the land." "Thus, until plaintiffs purchased their house in June of 1975, there is no evidence that
defendants' predecessors had been disseised of the land. The evidence did show that
thereafter plaintiffs treated the land as their own, and did so unmistakably. They
removed the vines without permission. They removed a fountain without permission.
They planted trees and shrubs without permission. They blocked defendants' access to
the land with a fence without permission. They planted a garden without permission. In
short, plaintiffs exercised the powers of ownership in such a way that they deprived
first the defendants' predecessors and then defendants of any meaningful possession of "The record shows that neither defendants nor their predecessors took any action to regain possession of the land until July 5, 1990, when they filed a trespass counterclaim against plaintiffs. Thus, the controlling issue is whether defendants' cause of action accrued before or after July 5, 1975." (pp.439-441) Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in this case fell about two months short of proving when the "some point" in time was. 6. Jones and Smith City or the State of Michigan argue about a common boundary. In this type of case, the Courts have changed directions a number of times and note
that differing rules may apply to different types of municipalities. The black letter law of
Staub v Tripp, 248 Mich 45 (1929) and Young v Thendara. Inc., 328 Mich 42
(1950) is that title against the State cannot be obtained by adverse possession. In
Gerrick Township v Ester, 201 Mich App 532 (1993), the Michigan Court of
Appeals noted by way of a footnote that the sign owned by the defendants in that case
was within the boundaries of a state highway since 1946, but it was not a subject of
adverse possession since title may not be acquired by adverse possession against the
state citing Young v Thendara. Inc. This late citation overlooks another chain of cases
which has held to the contrary. Starting recently with Caywood v DNR, 71 Mich App
322, 248 NW2d 253 (1976); then Mackinaw Island Development Company. Ltd. v Burton Abstract & Title Company, 132 Mich App 504; and Gorte
v Department of
Transportation, 202 Mich App 151, the Court of Appeals held to the contrary and
went along with a continuously existing statute allowing such adverse possession but While it was until 1988 that adverse possession claims were abolished as to the state, it
was in 1907 that they abolished as to municipalities. See also Section 5821 of the
Revised Judicature Act. Note, however, that Section 5821 of the Revised Judicature
Act is not entirely dispositive of the issue of roadway width where the road is
established by user under MCL 221.20 et. seq., MSA 9.21 et. seq. While that statute
speaks of the road being 4 rods wide, the presumption of the 66 foot wide road can
be overcome by evidence of a narrower actual use. For example, Rigoni v Michigan A Final Note Cases of this nature are extremely fact specific and other than the predilection of the
Court to honor long established occupancy lines and the return to the correct view as
to adverse possession against the state prior to 1988, one can scarcely find general
rules that one can be sure of applying in every single case to which the chosen rule may
seem to apply. For this reason, it is of vital importance for any person undertaking
litigation of a boundary line or adverse possession case that he or she take a special
pain to familiarize him or herself with all the facts of the case, to view the actual
property in question, to obtain all of the evidence that can possibly be considered
relevant and to sift the same through the numerous sieves of relevant case law. In
preparing this presentation, I have looked in large measure to Cameron on Michigan
Real Property Law for the case authority. However, it is my recommendation that
should you become involved in a case of this nature that you go beyond Cameron to
the cases themselves as may be found by searching the various CD Rom disk
collections of cases of Michigan. One will soon find that there are numerous lines of
cases on similar issues which do not cross-cite each other and unless you are extremely
lucky, will not turn up in a Shepard citation search. On "Lawdesk" CD-Rom, I found
487 cases contain both of the words "boundary" and "line"; 156 cases contain all of the
words "boundary," "line" and "dispute"; 57 cases contain all of the words "boundary,"
"line," "dispute" and "acquiescence"; 141 cases contain all of the words "boundary," © John A. Scott |
Back
to List